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Abstract
We propose a model of the household where the transmission mechanism between
home appliances and women’s labor supply is identical to the one in Greenwood, Se-
shadri, and Yorukoglu (2005) with one important exception. We explicitly model
firms’ pricing and output choices in the appliances sector and thus, the price of home
appliances is determined endogenously by the laws of supply and demand rather than
being taken exogenously from outside the model. We use this new framework to char-
acterize the general equilibrium effects of rising household wages on the price of home
appliances, and thus ultimately women’s labor supply. The ratio between the price of
home appliances and household wages declines following a rise in the wage level, which
leads to widespread adoption of home appliances and increased labor force participa-
tion of married women. A numerical example shows that rising wages account for half
of the increase in participation of married women between 1960 and 1970.
∗We thank two anonymous referees, Myong-Hun Chang, and Alice Schoonbroodt for their comments.
All errors are ours. Correspondence: veronika.dolar@liu.edu.
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1 Introduction
Recent research in family economics emphasizes households’ adoption of productivity-enhancing
technology at home (home appliances) as a key catalyst for women’s emancipation during
the twentieth century, potentially accounting for the surge in labor force participation of
married women (Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu, 2005) (later GSY), higher divorce
rates (Greenwood and Guner, 2008), as well as changes in fertility decisions (Greenwood,
Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke, 2005). In the aforementioned papers, a sharp decline in the
price of home appliances follows from total factor productivity growth in the household sec-
tor and the adoption of new capital allows households (married women) to produce home
goods with less time. Embedding Becker’s (1991) unitary framework of family economics
into dynamic macroeconomic models, families are now faced with a joint decision. First,
should they adopt home appliances in the current period or wait for a lower price? In GSY,
the head of the household must also decide whether the woman should work in the market
place or not.
The quantitative analysis in GSY suggests important interaction effects between home
appliances adoption and labor supply. Technological progress in the household sector alone
can account for more than half of the rise in female labor force participation. In contrast,
narrowing of the gender gap alone accounts for only ten percentage points. In other words,
the elasticity of female labour supply is low for households who choose not to adopt, while
as more households adopt the new technology at home, the responsiveness of female labor
supply to a narrowing in the gender gap increases. Recent empirical work also confirmed
that the mechanism in GSY is supported by the data. For example, Cavalcanti and Tavares
(2008) use time-series data on the price of home appliances in OECD countries for the
period between 1975 and 1999 to show that a decrease in the relative price of appliances
had a positive and signicant effect on women’s labor force participation in OECD countries.
Coen-Pirani et al. (2010) study micro-data from the 1960 and 1970 U.S. Census and find that
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ownership of washing machines, dryers, and freezers all contributed to the increase of the
participation rate of married women in the labor market. Cardia (2010) analyzes the 1940
and 1950 U.S. county level Census data. She finds that the adoption of modern appliances
such as modern stoves and refrigerators did not have a signicant impact on women’s labor
participation rates but helped increase womens participation in professional occupations.
In this paper, we propose a general equilibrium model of the household where the trans-
mission mechanism between home appliances and women’s labor supply is identical to the
one in GSY with one important exception. We explicitly model firms’ pricing and output
choices in the appliances sector as well as industry dynamic and thus, the key variable in
GSY and the other aforementioned papers – the price of home appliances – is determined
endogenously by the laws of supply and demand rather than being taken exogenously from
outside the model. We use this new framework to characterize the general equilibrium ef-
fects of rising household wages on the price of home appliances, and thus ultimately women’s
labor supply.
The following mechanisms determine the equilibrium value of home appliances prices.
On the one hand, given our choice of utility function where home appliances are a normal
good, the demand for home appliances shift outward following a rise in household wages
which leads to higher prices for home appliances. On the other hand, there are two forces
pushing home appliances prices down. First and as in GSY, total factor productivity in the
appliances sector grows at an exogenously given rate. Second, we assume that competition
in the home appliances sector is imperfect and we model the strategic interaction between
firms as a Cournot game. As the market size of the home appliances sector increases, short-
term profit opportunities attract new entrants which shifts supply outward and drive the
price of home appliances further down.
Our main result is that the ratio between the price of home appliances and household
wages declines following a rise in the wage level, which in turn leads to greater adoption
rate and labor force participation of married women. As such, a new mechanism emerges
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where total factor productivity in all sectors of the economy affects the decision of women
to work. This new result is interesting since others have shown elsewhere that women’s
labor force participation decision depends on the earning gap between husband and wife
but is unaffected by technological progress and its effect on the level of household wages
(Benhabib et al., 1991 or Jones et al., 2003). Here, because rising wages indirectly make the
home technology more affordable, married women decide to join the work force even though
the earning gap with their husband is unchanged.
Our mechanism linking households’ wages to rising labor force participation of married
women rests upon the assumption that home appliances are a normal good. Empirical
studies show that a positive relationship exists between income and durable goods although
the magnitude of income elasticity varies depending on the context. At the business cycle
frequency, the seminal paper by Bar-Ilan and Blinder (1987) shows that expenditures on
durables display very large short-run elasticity to changes in permanent income. Research
by Dubin and McFadden (1984) and Reiss and White (2005) jointly estimate the demand
for appliances and the demand for electrity. Conditional on the stock of home appliances,
they show that electricity demand is not very sensitive to variations in income but to the
extent that income affects electricity consumption, it works through households’ choices of
appliances rather than through utilization behavior. More directly related to our study,
Miller (1960) estimates a demand function for refrigerators in the U.S. using cross-section
data at the state level between 1930 and 1940 and finds a positive effect of individual income.
Day (1992) shows that richer households in Canada adopted home appliances first. Finally,
Cardia (2010) discusses potential endogeneity problems in estimating the impact of income
on women’s labor supply decision. Wealthy counties have better infrastructures, generate
higher incomes which can buy more modern appliances and can also offer more opportunities
for women.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our
model and define an equilibrium. In Section 3, we derive the main qualitative results of
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the paper. In Section 4, we present a numerical example to analyze the impact of rising
household wages on labor force participation of married women between 1960 and 1970. We
offer concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 The model
We present a general equilibrium model of the family with a continuum of households and
firms that operate in the home appliances and market good sectors.
2.1 Households
Preferences: Households consist of one man and one woman with preferences defined over
consumption of a market composite good, ct, home good, cht, and leisure of men and women,
by lmt and l
f
t . Market and home good are consumed as public goods; labor income is pooled;
men and women have identical preferences and choose allocation of consumption and leisure
jointly to maximize household utility:1
µmU(ct, cht, l
m
t ) + µ
fU(ct, cht, l
f
t ) (1)
where (µm, µf ) ∈ (0, 1)2 denote the bargaining power of men and women within the house-
hold with µm + µf = 1.
Here we assume that individual preferences for men and women are given by U(x, y, z) =
α ln(x) + β ln(y) + (1 − α − β) ln(z) implying that the household objective function in
1Even though Browning and Chiappori (1998) show that assumptions underlying the “the unitary model”
(pooled income, identical preferences, and joint utility maximization) are rejected by the data, the unitary
framework is still commonly used in macroeconomic models of the family (e.g., Jones et al. (2003), GSY,
and the references hereinabove). As an alternative to the unitary model, Browning et al. (2011) develop the
“collective” approach to family economics where individual members of a family – as opposed to the family
as a whole – act as core decision-makers. As a result, household behavior reflects Pareto-efficient decisions
collectively reached by all family members.
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equation (1) is equal to:
α ln(ct) + β ln(cht) + (1− α− β)(µm ln(lmt ) + µf ln(lft )) (2)
where (α, β) ∈ (0, 1)2 and α + β < 1.2
Market ability and matching: We denote by λm and λf men’s and women’s ability in
the market place, respectively.3 We assume perfect assortative matching between husbands’
and wives’ market ability so that the man with the highest market ability is married to
the woman with the highest market ability, the man with the second best market ability
is married to the woman with the second best market ability and so on and so forth.4 We
assume that the gender wage ratio between women and men, ϕ =
wft(λf )
wmt(λm)
, is constant across
households and less than one, although we do not explicitly model why women earn less
2With the use of a simple static example, Jones et al. (2003) study what restrictions must be imposed
on preferences so that improvements in the home technology lead to an increase in women’s hours worked.
One possibility is that home and market goods are complements. However, McGrattan et al. (1997) and
Rupert et al. (2000) estimate that consumption of home and market goods are substitutes. When household
preferences are unit-elastic as in our model, a decline in the price of home appliances can only affect women’s
labor supply if there is satiation in the home good. The home technology described hereinbelow, with only
two qualities of durable goods and which is the same as in GSY, de facto generates satiation in the home
good. As a result, declining home appliances prices lead to greater labor force participation of married
women.
3The only source of household heterogeneity is market ability. In a slightly different but related context,
Jones et al. (2011) show that the negative relationship between fertility and income in cross-sectional data
can be obtained in two different ways. Women can differ in either their market ability or their preferences
for children, though differences in market ability are easier identified by data.
4Burdett and Coles (1999) as well as Browning et al. (2011) find evidence of assortative matching
in the marriage market, especially along the education dimension. A recent paper by Greenwood et al.
(2014) analyses data from the United States Census Bureau and finds a rise in assortative mating. The
authors propose a mechanism whereby a rise in assortative mating affects household income inequality.
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than men in the workplace.5,6 In addition and in contrast to Jones et al. (2003), human
capital accumulation is not an option here implying that market ability of men and women
do not change over time.
Home good production: We assume that all housework is done by women. Inputs used in
home production consist of stock of household durable goods, dt, time spent on housework,
nt and we denote by ζt labor-augmenting technological progress in the household sector. To
model the concepts of adoption and diffusion and as in GSY, household durables are lumpy
and labor is indivisible.
Two different Leontief (fixed-proportion) technologies are available to produce home
goods. The first one which is labor-intensive uses one unit of durable goods and ρη of
women’s time to produce one unit of the home good with 0 < ρη < 1 and ρ > 1. In
contrast, if households adopt the labor-saving technology, κ unit of home good can be
produced using κ unit of durable goods and η of women’s time with κ > 1. In summary,
if households do not buy home appliances, women spent a fraction ρη of their time doing
chores and home good production is equal to c1ht = min{1, ζρη} = 1 with ζ = 1ρη . On the
other hand, when households buy home appliances, women devote a fraction η of their time
5Differences in pay between men and women are well documented (e.g., Goldin (1990), Goldin(1997), and
Blau and Kahn (2000)). Differences in pay between men and women can measure either the direct effects of
wage discrimination (the payment of lower wages to one group despite equivalent training and work duties)
or differences in unmeasured (by the econometrician) skills that are correlated with sex. These differences in
skills themselves could be due to discrimination (e.g., glass ceilings and marriage bars (Goldin, 1990) or due
to other, non-discriminatory, incentives for the development of skills across the sexes (e.g., specialization in
the provision of home goods and child care).
6The assumption that the gender wage ratio is constant across households, which is also found in Green-
wood et al. (2005), allows the model to be tractable analytically. Bar and Leukhina (2011) who estimate
the joint distribution of earnings between men and women study the quantitative impact of decline in the
price of home appliances and the gender wage gap on time allocation at home and in the workplace. They
find that falling cost of home appliances affects allocation of time outside of the workforce the most, while
reductions in the gender earnings gap affect married women decision to work the most.
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to home good production which is equal to c2ht = min{κ, ζ ′η} = κ with ζ ′ = κη . Note that
c2ht > c
1
ht since κ > 1.
Time Constraints: We assume different time constraints for men and women which are
given by:
lft + t
f
wet + nt(at) = 1
lmt + t
m
w = 1
(3)
where (tfw, t
m
w ) ∈ (0, 1)2 are fixed parameters representing the length of the workweek for men
and women, respectively7; at ∈ {0, 1} denotes household’s decision for appliances adoption
and et ∈ {0, 1} the decision for women’s work with at = 1 when households buy home
appliances and et = 1 when women decide to work.
8
The time spent by women on housework given the appliances adoption decision, nt(at),
is equal to nt(1) = η when household buy home appliances and nt(0) = ρη if they do not
with nt(1) < nt(0) since ρ > 1.
9
Budget Constraint: The household budget constraint equates labor income to spending
7McGrattan and Rogerson (2004) study changes in hours worked for men and women since 1950. They
find that women who are employed full-time work fewer hours compared to men employed full-time and that
hours worked conditional on working has changed very little since 1950. Our assumption that men always
work in the marketplace comes from the fact that men and women have the same productivity at home but
men earn more than women in the market place even after controlling for differences in market ability.
8All decisions in the model, adoption and labor supply, are made at the extensive margin. This is without
loss of generality and GSY shows that qualitative results go through when labor and household durables
are divisible. See Jones et al. (2003) for a model where men and women decide how many hours to work,
i.e. labor supply decisions are made at the intensive margin. Also selling appliances is not an option for
households with at ∈ {0, 1}.
9The time spent on house chores given the home appliances adoption decision can be written succinctly
nt(at) = η(1+(ρ−1)(1−at)) and it is easy to check that nt(1) = η and nt(0) = ρη. It is also straightforward
to check that women who buy appliances save on housework time, nt(1) − nt(0) = η − ρη = η(1 − ρ) < 0,
since the parameter ρ > 1.
8
on market goods and home appliances:
ct + patat = wmt(λm) + wft(λf )et (4)
where wmt and wft are the real market wage for men and women, respectively, pat denotes
the price of home appliances, and we normalize the price of the market good to one.
In the rest of the paper, we assume that markets wages are proportional to market ability
implying that wmt(λm) = λmwt and wft(λf ) = λfwt with wt the real market wage. Given
our assumptions that the gender wage ratio is constant across households and that we have
perfect assortative matching in market ability between husband and wife, women’s earnings
are equal to a fraction of men’s earnings with wft(λf ) = λfwt = ϕλmwt. As a result, the
budget constraint can be re-written as:
ct + patat = wtλm(1 + ϕet) (5)
We are now able to formulate the household utility maximization problem. In every
period, taking the price of labor-saving appliances pat and the market wage wt as given,
households where men’s ability equals λm choose market good consumption, ct, home good
consumption, cht, women’s employment et ∈ {0, 1}, whether to adopt home appliances
at ∈ {0, 1}, leisure of men and women (lmt , lft ) to maximize the household joint utility in
equation (2) subject to the budget and time constraints in equations (3) and (5), respectively.
That is:
max
(ct,cht,at,et,l
m
t ,l
f
t )
α ln(ct) + β ln(cht) + (1− α− β)(µm ln(lmt ) + µf ln(lft ))
s.t. 
ct + patat = wtλm(1 + ϕet)
if at = 1, then cht = κ
if at = 0, then cht = 1
lft + t
f
wet + η(1 + (ρ− 1)(1− at)) = 1
lmt + t
m
w = 1
at ∈ {0, 1}, et ∈ {0, 1}, ct ≥ 0, 0 ≤ lmt ≤ 1, 0 ≤ lft ≤ 1
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2.2 Firms
2.2.1 Appliances sector
The appliances sector is oligopolistic and firms play a Cournot game.10 Home appliances are
produced with a linear technology and operating firms incur a fixed cost, χ, which creates
natural entry barriers.
We let ya,i,t, Yat, and Ya,−i,t represent the output of firm i, total output in the appliances
sector, and the output of all firms except for firm i, respectively. Given the market wage
and the demand for appliances, pat(Yat), firm i chooses output and employment level, la,i,t,
to maximize profits taking as given Ya,−i,t.
max
(ya,i,t,la,i,t)≥0
Πa,i,t = pat(Ya,−i,t + ya,i,t)ya,i,t − wtla,i,t − χ
s.t. ya,i,t ≤ Aatla,i,t
(6)
where Aat represents total factor productivity in the appliances sector.
Since all firms have access to the same technology, we restrict our analysis to symmetric
equilibrium where ya,i,t = ya,t for all i. Operating firms maximize profits when the following
first-order condition is met:
p
′
at(Yat)ya,t + pat(Yat) =
wt
Aat
(7)
In addition, the free-entry condition implies that operating firms make non-negative
profits, while firms outside the market expect to make negative profits if they enter. The
zero-profit condition is given by:
pat(Ya,t)ya,t − wtya,t
Aat
= χ (8)
10In the Appendix, we provide evidence on the 4-firm concentration ratio supporting that competition in
the home appliances industry is oligopolistic.
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2.2.2 Market sector
The market sector is perfectly competitive and output is produced with a constant returns
to scale technology. Given the market wage, firms choose the output level, ymt, and labor
input, lmt, to maximize profits:
max
(lmt,ymt)∈<2+
Πmt = Amtlmt − wtlmt (9)
where Amt represents total factor productivity in the market sector. The solution to the
firm’s problem is given by wt = Amt implying that the labor demand is perfectly elastic and
firms’ profits are equal to zero.
2.3 Equilibrium definition
We denote by a(λm,
pat
wt
) and e(λm,
pat
wt
) the optimal household decision for appliances adop-
tion and women’s work in a λm ability household. We let f(λm) and F (λm) be the probability
and cumulative density function of men’s ability, respectively.
The aggregate demand for home appliances in every period, Da, is the measure of house-
holds which adopts the new technology:
Da =
∫ +∞
0
a(λm,
pat
wt
)f(λm)dλm (10)
where f(λm) denotes the probability density function of men’s market ability distribution.
On the other hand, women’s and men’s labor supply, Sf and Sm, are equal to:
Sf =
∫ +∞
0
ϕλme(λm,
pat
wt
)f(λm)dλm, Sm =
∫ +∞
0
λmf(λm)dλm (11)
Definition 1. Given an exogenous sequence for total factor productivity in market and appli-
ances sectors, {(Amt, Aat)}+∞t=1 and a market ability gender gap, ϕ, a general equilibrium for
our economy is a sequence of prices {pat, wt}+∞t=1 and allocations for households, {(at, et)}+∞t=1 ,
and firms, {(ymt, yat, lmt, lat)}+∞t=1 , such that:
11
1. Given prices, households choose {(at, et)}+∞t=1 to maximize utility (2) subject to the
budget and time constraints (5). Firms in both sectors choose labor and output level,
{(ymt, yat, lmt, lat)}+∞t=1 to maximize profits and the zero-profit condition in equation (8)
is satisfied.
2. Labor and home appliances market clear:11
(a) lat + lmt = Sf (patwt ) + Sm(
pat
wt
),
(b) Yat = Da(patwt ).
3 Qualitative Results
To characterize the model qualitative properties for women’s decision to work and household
adoption decision of home appliances, we compare the utility U(et, at) of a household of type
λm for all possible values for at and et:

U(0, 0) = α ln(wtλm) + (1− α− β)(µm ln(1− tmw ) + µf ln(1− ρη))
U(0, 1) = α ln(wtλm − pat) + β ln(κ) + (1− α− β)(µm ln(1− tmw ) + µf ln(1− η))
U(1, 0) = α ln(wtλm(1 + ϕ)) + (1− α− β)(µm ln(1− tmw ) + µf ln(1− tfw − ρη))
U(1, 1) = α ln(wtλm(1 + ϕ)− pat) + β ln(κ) + (1− α− β)(µm ln(1− tmw ) + µf ln(1− tfw − η))
(12)
Let us analyze the employment decision of women who do not adopt home appliances
first. Straightforward algebra reveals that U(1, 0) ≤ U(0, 0) if and only if 0 < ϕ ≤ ϕ2 where
ϕ2 ≡ ( 1−ρη
1−tfw−ρη
)
(1−α−β)µf
α −1. In other words, women who do not buy home appliances do not
work if the gender wage ratio is below a threshold value. Note that the inequality ϕ ≤ ϕ2
does not depend on the price of home appliances or men’s ability. As a result, since the
gender wage ratio ϕ is constant due to our assumption of perfect assortative matching in
11Implicitly we assume that Walras’ Law holds and thus chose not to include a market clearing condition
for the goods market in our definition of competitive equilibrium.
12
ability between men and women, only one of the following (mutually exclusive) alternatives
can be true. When ϕ ≤ ϕ2 all women who work bought home appliances. On the other
hand, when ϕ > ϕ2 all women that choose not to buy home appliances work. We formalize
these results in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If ϕ ≤ ϕ2 then et = 1⇒ at = 1.
Proof. Suppose that ϕ ≤ ϕ2. Then U(1, 0) ≤ U(0, 0) implying at = 0 ⇒ et = 0. The
contrapositive of (at = 0 ⇒ et = 0) is (et = 1 ⇒ at = 1). Hence, we showed the desired
result: If ϕ ≤ ϕ2 then et = 1⇒ at = 1.
When ϕ ≤ ϕ2 we showed that buying home appliances is a necessary condition for
women to join the labor force. Is buying home appliances also a sufficient condition for
women to work? Without adding further restriction on the gender wage ratio, the answer
is no. Suppose that at = 1. Work is optimal U(1, 1) ≥ U(0, 1) if and only if ϕ ≥ (1 −
pat
λmwt
)[( 1−η
1−tfw−η
)
(1−α−β)µf
α − 1]. The latter inequality implies that, conditional on buying home
appliances, women with lower ability who are married to men with low market ability choose
to work. On the other hand, women with high ability who are married to high ability men
choose not to work because of the income effect of husband’s wages.
Let us define ϕ1 ≡ [( 1−η
1−tfw−η
)
(1−α−β)µf
α − 1] with ϕ2 > ϕ1 > 0. The next proposition shows
that all women who buy home appliances work when the gender wage ratio is above a given
threshold.
Lemma 2. If ϕ ≥ ϕ1 then at = 1⇒ et = 1.
Proof. U(1, 1) ≥ U(0, 1) if and only if ϕ ≥ (1− pat
λmwt
)[( 1−η
1−tfw−η
)
(1−α−β)µf
α − 1]. For all values
of pat
λmwt
, we have ϕ1 > (1 − patλmwt )[(
1−η
1−tfw−η
)
(1−α−β)µf
α − 1]. Hence, if one imposes ϕ ≥ ϕ1,
U(1, 1) ≥ U(0, 1) implying that et = 1 is the optimal work decision when at = 1. Hence, we
showed the desired result: If ϕ ≥ ϕ1 then at = 1⇒ et = 1.
When one combines the previous two lemmas, we get the result that the decision to
work and the decision to adopt home appliances are equivalent when the gender wage ratio
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belongs to the interval [ϕ1, ϕ2]. That is at = 1 ⇔ et = 1 when ϕ1 ≤ ϕ ≤ ϕ2. As a result,
to fully characterize household decisions, it is enough to analyze the adoption decision by
households and compare U(1, 1) to U(0, 0). The following proposition summarizes decisions
of type-λm households:
Lemma 3 (Households’ Optimal Decisions). If ϕ1 ≤ ϕ ≤ ϕ2, then the optimal employment
and adoption decisions of type-λm households are given by:
e(λm,
pat
wt
) = a(λm,
pat
wt
) = 1⇔ λm ≥ λˆmt (13)
where the ability threshold λˆmt ≡ patwtφ(ϕ) and the function φ(ϕ) = 1+ϕ−(
1−ρη
1−tfw−η
)
(1−α−β)µf
α ( 1
κ
)
β
α .
Proof. Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 show that adoption of home appliances and women’s de-
cision to work are equivalent (a1 = 1 ⇔ et = 1) when ϕ1 ≤ ϕ ≤ ϕ2. To link the adop-
tion decision to the price of home appliances, it is thus enough to compare U(1, 1) and
U(0, 0). Straightforward algebra reveals that U(1, 1) ≥ U(0, 0) if and only if 1 +ϕ− pat
λmwt
≥
( 1−ρη
1−tfw−η
)
(1−α−β)µf
α ( 1
κ
)
β
α . Define φ(ϕ) ≡ 1 + ϕ − ( 1−ρη
1−tfw−η
)
(1−α−β)µf
α ( 1
κ
)
β
α . Then the previous
inequality can be rewritten as φ(ϕ) ≥ pat
λmtwt
or after rearranging λm ≥ patφ(ϕ)wt . Define
λˆmt ≡ patφ(ϕ)wt . We have the desired result: e(λm,
pat
wt
) = a(λm,
pat
wt
) = 1⇔ λm ≥ λˆmt.
Given the relative price of home appliances, pat
wt
, and the ability gap between husband
and wife ϕ, the previous proposition defines the marginal ability of the last households that
buy home appliances. In all households with ability greater than λˆmt women work and home
appliances are adopted. On the other hand, women in households with ability less than the
threshold find it optimal to operate the labor-intensive technology and do not work.
According to Lemma 3, the demand for appliances in equation (10) is equal to:
Da =
∫ +∞
0
a(λm,
pat
wt
)f(λm)dλm =
∫ +∞
λˆmt
f(λm)dλm = 1− F ( pat
wtφ(ϕ)
) (14)
where F (·) denotes the cumulative density function of men’s market ability distribution.
Women’s labor supply is equal to:
Sf = ϕ
∫ +∞
0
λme(λm,
pat
wt
)f(λm)dλm = ϕ
∫ +∞
λˆmt
λmf(λm)dλm (15)
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where the second equality follows from the fact that the gender wage ratio ϕ is constant
across households.
Three different forces lead to a lower marginal ability threshold λˆmt =
pat
wtφ(ϕ)
implying
an increase in labor force participation rate and greater adoption of home appliances. First,
TFP growth in the appliances sector that pushes the price of home appliances down as in
GSY; second, an increase in the gender ability ratio as in Jones et al. (2003). This paper
proposes a third mechanism whereby rising wages affect the price of home appliances and
thus the participation rate of married women.
In the Appendix we show that the first-order condition for firms in the home appliances
sector in equation (7) can be re-written as:
−wtφ(ϕ)
f(λˆmt)
yat + pat =
wt
Aat
(16)
Similarly, the free-entry condition in equation (8) is equal to:
wmtyat(φ(ϕ)λˆmt − 1
Aat
) = χ (17)
Eliminating yat from equations (16) and (17) let us link the market ability of the marginal
household that adopts the home appliances to TFP in the goods and home appliances sector
as well as the gender gap in ability:
(φ(ϕ)λˆmt − 1
Aat
)2f(λˆmt) =
χφ(ϕ)
wmt
(18)
We clarify the impact of technological progress in the market sector on women’s employ-
ment and household appliances adoption decision in the next proposition.
Proposition 1. Everything else equal, a market wage threshold level exists, w¯m > 0, such
that equation (18) has no solution when wmt < w¯m and at least one solution that satisfies
∂λˆmt
∂wmt
≤ 0 when wmt ≥ w¯m.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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Proposition 1, which is the central result of the paper, states that the fraction of women
joining the labor force increases as the market wage goes up since more households buy
home appliances. The general equilibrium effect of market wage on women’s decision to
work is interesting because it contrasts with the predictions of existing neoclassical models
of home production where women’s employment decisions primarily depend on the earning
gap between husband and wife (see Benhabib et al., 1991 or Jones et al., 2003). In these
models, changes in the market wage level have no impact on women’s employment decisions.
Due to our assumption of perfectly assortative matching between men and women’s mar-
ket ability, women who are married to high ability men are the first ones to adopt home
appliances and work. While there is evidence that richer households adopted home appli-
ances first (Day, 1992) and that home appliances adoption had a positive impact on labor
force participation of married women (Coen-Pirani et al., 2011), the data is less supportive
that women in the upper deciles of the income distribution were the first ones to work.
Schoonbroodt (2003) analyzes the relationship between labor force participation of married
women and husband income score decile in the U.S. Census between 1900 and 1990. Inter-
estingly, she finds that labor force participation is flat across income level. To obtain the flat
relationship between women’s labor force participation and husband income, Schoonbroodt
(2003) suggests to add some source of heterogeneity that is itself income dependent to cancel
out the effect of falling prices, but still keeping the increase in the participation rate. For
example, if matching is less than perfect, then high ability women married to low ability
men are more inclined to work, while the same women would not participate if married to
a high ability (income) man.
Note that households do not adopt home appliances immediately but wait for relative
prices to drop to more reasonable levels, a property also observed in GSY’s model. When
the market wage is below the threshold w¯m, households choose to operate the labor-intensive
technology for home production because the cost of home appliances is very high relative
to the market wage. No home appliances are produced and output in the appliances sector
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is equal to zero. As technological progress in the market sector unfolds, the price of home
appliances gradually declines relative to the market wage since pat
wt
= φ(ϕ)λˆmt and
∂λˆmt
∂wmt
≤ 0.
As a result, a positive fraction of the population, 1 − F (λˆmt), can afford to adopt the new
technology and this fraction increases over time.
The next proposition characterizes the general equilibrium effects of rising wages on the
price of home appliances.
Proposition 2. A threshold for market ability λ¯ > 0 exists such that:
1. ∂pat
∂wmt
< 0 when λˆmt > λ¯,
2. ∂pat
∂wmt
≥ 0 when λˆmt ≤ λ¯.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The previous proposition shows that the price of appliances initially declines when the
home appliances adoption rate as measured by λˆmt is low. This happens because with profits
opportunity looming large, many new firms enter the market and the depressing effects of a
greater supply outweigh the outward shift in the demand for home appliances due to higher
household wages. After a while, house appliances adoption becomes widespread and the
price of home appliances increases with wages as the income effect dominates.
The next proposition shows that the threshold ability λˆmt decreases with the home
productivity level Aat and the gender wage ratio ϕ. These results are expected since there
is a direct inverse relationship between home appliances prices and total factor productivity
in the sector. A narrowing of the gender wage gap implies that more women join the labor
force, although lower discrimination levels have less of an impact on women’s labor supply
compared to Jones et al. (2003) since accumulating human capital is not an option in our
model.
Proposition 3. Everything else equal, a home productivity threshold level exists, A¯a, such
that equation (18) has no solution when Aat < A¯a and at least one solution that satisfies
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∂λˆmt
∂Aat
≤ 0 when Aat ≥ A¯a. In addition, equation (18) has at least one solution that satisfies
∂λˆmt
∂ϕ
≤ 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
4 A Numerical Example
In this section, we propose a numerical analysis of equation (18) to illustrate how rising
household wages affected the price of home appliances and labor force participation decision
of married women between 1960 and 1970. One reason we chose this time frame, rather
than the period between 1900 and 1985 examined by GSY, is the study by Coen-Pirani et
al. (2010) that finds strong empirical support in the 1960 and 1970 U.S. Census micro-data
for the mechanism proposed by GSY.
Based on a sample including white, U.S.-born, married women of prime working age (18-
55 years old), with non-missing information on state of residence and appliance ownership,
not living in group quarters and with working husbands, Coen-Pirani et al. (2010) find that
labor force participation rate for married women increased from 33 percent in 1960 to 43
percent in 1970.12 For the same sample, the median real household income, expressed in
2000 dollars, increased from $32,768 in 1960 to $39,384 in 1970.
We assume that adults are endowed with a total of 112 hours per week (excluding sleep)
to be divided between work, house chores, and leisure. The number of hours spent on house
chores decreased from 26 in 1960 to 20 were in 1970 (GSY).13 McGrattan and Rogerson
12Coen-Pirani et al. (2010) also find that hours worked by married women did not change appreciably
from 1960 to 1970, while other measures of labor force participation such as full-time employment (share of
married women working at least 35 hours in the past week), and year-round employment (share of married
women working at least 48 weeks in the past year) also indicate a large increase in female labor supply
during the 1960’s. These results confirm that the main changes in labor supply for married women occurred
at the extensive margin, not the intensive margin.
13Using data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics, Roberts and Rupert (1995) report that between
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(2004) find that women who work full-time spend 36 hours on the job. As a result, we have
tfw =
36
112
= 0.32, η = 20
112
= 0.18, and ρ = 26
20
= 1.3. The per-capita stock of appliances was
equal to $96.7 in 1960 and increased to $177.5 in 1970.14 As a result, we set κ = $177.5
$96.7
= 1.84.
We assume that men’s ability distribution follow a log-normal distribution with mean µ
and standard deviation σ. That is, f(λm) =
1
λm
√
2piσ
e−
(ln(λm)−µ)2
2σ2 and F (λm) =
∫ λm
−∞ f(u)du.
We follow Greenwood et al. (2003) who estimates the standard deviation of men’s income
distribution within a dynamic general equilibrium model and finds that σ = 0.9. We choose
his value for the standard deviation and normalize the mean of men’s ability distribution
to be equal to 100, which implies that µ = −0.92
2
+ ln(100) = 4.2. According to Coen-
Pirani et al. (2010), the labor force participation rate of women in 1960 is 33 percent. As
a result the threshold ability of the marginal household that buys home appliances is equal
to λˆ1960 = F
−1(0.67; 4.2, 0.9) = 99.07.
We fix ϕ1960 = 0.6 as this is the value for the women-to-men wage ratio in 1960 in the
historical income table P-36 of the Census bureau for men and women who work full-time
all-year around.
For preference parameters, we take the same values as in GSY with α = β = 1
3
and
we assume equal bargaining power between men and women and thus fix µf = 0.5. Our
parameter values imply φ(ϕ1960) = 0.6478.
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1976 and 1988 the time spent on housework by a working wife continues to fall from 20.2 hours per week to
15.9 hours. The time spent by a non-working wife dropped very slightly from 34.0 to 32.2 h per week.
14Source: U.S. Census: Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth in the United States, 1925-2010 - Table 707.
15Throughout the paper, we worked with the assumption that men and women have equal bargaining
power within the household, a heroic assumption for sure both in the unitary framework or the collective
bargaining one of Chiappori et al. (2011). A legitimate and open research question therefore is how an
asymmetric bargaining power affect women’s participation decision as well as home appliances decision. For
example, it would make sense that the rate of adoption of home appliances increases, reflecting a heavier
weight on women’s utility. In our model however, we find that although changes in woman’s bargaining
power affect the threshold φ(ϕ), a higher value of µf does not alter the qualitative results as stated in
Proposition 1 to 3. In addition, given our choice of functional forms for preferences and technology, a higher
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We use equation (7) to pin down total factor productivity in the home appliances sector
in 1960. After rearranging, we get Aa,1960 =
w1960/pa,1960
1+pa
where pa is the price elasticity for
home appliances. We choose a value of -0.3 for pa based on Dale and Fujita (2008) who find
that the price elasticity for home appliances varies between -0.42 for dishwasher to -0.37 for
refrigerators and -0.14 for cloth dryers. The average cost of a refrigerator in 1960 was $289
which expressed in 2000 dollars equals $1,356. As a result, total factor productivity in the
home sector in 1960 is equal to Aa,1960 = 34.5.
In our first counterfactual experiment, we assess the impact of TFP growth in the market
good sector on the price of home appliances and women’s labor supply, independently of
TFP growth in the appliances sector and changes in the gender wage ratio. We ask: If
market wages grew from $32,768 in 1960 to $39,384 in 1970 and there was no growth in
total factor productivity in the home appliances sector and no change in the gender wage
ratio, what would the labor force participation rate of married women be equal to in 1970?
By how much would the price of home appliances decline between 1960 and 1970?
The answer to the above question is obtained by solving for λˆ1970 in the following con-
dition which is derived from equation (18):
(φ(ϕ1960)λˆm,1970 − 1Aa,1960
φ(ϕ1960)λˆm,1960 − 1Aa,1960
)2f(λˆm,1970)
f(λˆm,1960)
=
wm,1960
wm,1970
(19)
Experiment results are summarized in Table 1 below. We find that the threshold market
ability decreased to λˆ1970 = 88.2 which implies labor force market participation for married
women increased by 4.8 percentage points (from 33 percent in 1960 to 37.8 percent in 1970)
compared to 10 percentage points in the data (from 33 percent in 1960 to 43 percent in
1970 – Coen-Pirani et al., 2011). Over the same period of time, the ratio between the home
appliances price and the median household wage declined by 11 percent as λˆ1970
λˆ1960
= 0.89.
Second, we assess the impact of TFP growth in the home appliances sector on women’s
labor supply, independently of TFP growth in the market good sector and changes in the
value for µf has no quantitative effects on changes in labor supply as summarized in Table 1 below.
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gender wage ratio. Bar and Leukhina (2011) analyze data from the National Income and
Product Accounts on kitchen appliances which does not include TVs and VCRs.16 They find
that the price of home appliances declined by 26 percent relative to market wages between
1960 and 1970 which implies a decline in the price of home appliances of 9 percent relative
to the numeraire for the entire period or 0.87 percent when compounded on an annual basis.
In our second counterfactual experiment, we ask: If TFP in the home appliances sector grew
by 9 percent between 1960 and 1970 and there is no growth in total factor productivity in
the market goods sector and no change in the gender wage ratio, what would the labor force
participation rate of married women be equal to in 1970?
The answer to the above question is obtained by solving for λˆ1970 in the following con-
dition: (φ(ϕ1960)λˆm,1970 − 1Aa,1970
φ(ϕ1960)λˆm,1960 − 1Aa,1960
)2f(λˆm,1970)
f(λˆm,1960)
= 1 (20)
We find that the threshold market ability is virtually unchanged to λˆ1970 = 98.5 which
implies labor force market participation for married women and increases by 0.3 percentage
points, from 33 percent in 1960 to 33.3 percent in 1970.
The gender wage ratio declined slightly from 0.6 to 0.58 between 1960 and 1970 (U.S.
Census - Table P-36: Historical income for men and women). We do not perform a counter-
factual analysis of the impact of changes in the gender wage ratio since our model mechanism
would predict a decline in labor force participation of married women between 1960 and 1970
which is not observed in the data.
Finally, we consider the impact of TFP growth in both sectors altogether with no changes
in the gender wage ratio. We ask: If market wages grew from $32,768 in 1960 to $39,384 in
16By 1960 many kitchen appliances were widely adopted across the U.S. households. For this reason and
because the price index in Bar and Leukhina (2011) does not include TV’s and VCRs, the rate of decline
for the home appliances prices in Bar and Leukhina (2011) is much smaller compared to the one in Gordon
(1990). Vandenbroucke (2009) conjectures that a decline in the price of goods which complements leisure
time, such as VCR and TVs, leads to a fall in labor market supply.
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1970 while TFP in the home appliances sector grew by 9 percent, and the gender wage ratio
is unchanged, what would the labor force participation rate of married women be equal to
in 1970? We find that the threshold market ability decreased to λˆ1970 = 87.4 which implies
labor force market participation for married women increased by 5.2 percentage points, from
33 percent in 1960 to 38.2 percent in 1970.17
Tab. 1: Change in Women’s Labor Force Participation, 1960-1970
1960 1970 Change (perc. pts)
Data (Coen-Pirani, 2011): 0.33 0.43 +10
Model :
- Market Wages alone: 0.33 0.378 +4.8
- TFP home appliances alone: 0.33 0.333 +0.3
- All (excl. changes in gender wage ratio): 0.33 0.382 +5.2
In summary, we find that the mechanisms presented in this paper linking changes in
the market wage to the adoption of home appliances and women’s labor force participation
decisions are quantitatively important. Increases in market wages taken alone account for
slightly less than half of the increase in labor force participation of married women between
1960 and 1970. Quantitatively, technological progress in the home appliances sector play
a lesser role compared to GSY. Finally, Proposition 3 shows that women’s labor force par-
ticipation increases with the gender wage ratio, which is also observed in historical data.
For the period we considered, however, the gender wage ratio declined which would place
our model’s predictions at odds with the observed change in labor force participation of
married women between 1960 and 1970. In addition, the quantitative impact of changes in
the gender wage ratio on women’s labor force participation would be more muted compared
to Jones et al. (2003) because agents cannot decide to accumulate human capital in our
17If we include decline in the gender wage ratio from 0.6 to 0.58, we find that labor force participation of
married women increased by only 3.6 percentage points from 33 percent in 1960 to 36.6 percent in 1970.
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model.
5 Concluding remarks
Recent research has linked the adoption of productivity-enhancing technology at home (home
appliances) to the rise in employment of married women in the twentieth century. Here
we proposed a simple model of household decisions to show that once the price of home
appliances is allowed to be determined endogenously, a new mechanism for women’s decision
to join the labor force emerges. Our main result is that total factor productivity growth
rates in all sectors as well as a narrowing gender wage gap contributed to women joining
the labor force by making home appliances more affordable. A numerical example suggests
that rising household wages account for half of the increase in labor force participation of
married women between 1960 and 1970.
We see two possible avenues for future research on the topic of household appliances
and female labor supply. First, we assumed that husbands and wives are perfectly matched
with respect to their market ability and that the gender wage ratio is constant across house-
holds. Although assortative matching in ability and education especially is well-documented
(Browning et al., 2011), relaxing these two assumptions would make the interaction between
women’s labor supply and the home appliances adoption decision richer. For example, if
some men with high market ability could marry women with low market ability (or women
who decide not to work for other reasons), then it might be possible that rich households
adopt home appliances first without necessary implying that women married to rich men
would join the labor force.
Another possible extension of our work would be to incorporate our mechanism into a
full-blown dynamic model and evaluate how much of the increase in labor force participation
of married women in the U.S. during the twentieth century can be accounted for by rising
household wages. We leave these two important projects for future research.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Concentration ratios for the home appliances sector
In Table 2, we present the 4-firm concentration ratio for four home appliances between 1960
and 1970: household vacuum cleaner (SIC: 3635), cooking appliances (SIC: 3631), refrig-
erator and home freezer (SIC: 3632), and automatic washing machines (SIC: 3633). Data
come from manufacturing reports published by the Census Bureau in Concentration Ratios
in Manufacturing between 1942 and 1997. The 4-firm concentration ratio is defined as the
percentage of market output generated by the four largest firms in the industry. Concentra-
tion ratios range from 48.3 for cooking appliances to 93.7 for laundry equipment. Although
there are no strict cutoffs or guidelines, an industry is considered perfectly competitive when
the 4-firm concentration ratio is less than 15 percent, monopolistic competition when con-
centration is less than 40 percent, and oligopolistic when concentration is greater than 40
percent. Concentration ratios suggest that competition in the home appliances sector is not
perfectly competitive between 1960 and 1970.
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Tab. 2: 4-Firm Concentration ratio and Herfindahl-Hirshman index by year, 1960-1970
Appliances Type Concentration Ratio
(4 largest firms)
Household Vacuum Cleaner (SIC: 3635)
Year - 1963 : 81%
1966: 78
1967: 76
1970: 79
Cooking Appliances (SIC: 3631)
1963: 51%
1966: 54
1967: 56
1970: 61
Refrigerator and Home Freezer (SIC: 3632)
1963: 74%
1966: 72
1967: 73
1970: 82
Laundry Equipment (SIC: 3633)
1963: 78%
1966: 79
1967: 78
1970: 83
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6.2 Equation (16)
We first show that the derivative of the demand for home appliances is equal to:
p
′
at(Yat) = −
wtφ(ϕ)
f(λˆmt)
(21)
Proof. According to the equilibrium condition in the home appliances sector as well as
equation (14), the equilibrium quantity of home appliances is equal to Yat = 1− F ( patwtφ(ϕ)).
Differentiate with respect to Yat, we get: 1 = −f( patwtφ(ϕ))
p
′
at(Yat)
wtφ(ϕ)
= −f(λˆmt)p
′
at(Yat)
wtφ(ϕ)
. Rear-
ranging, we obtain the desired result that p
′
at(Yat) = −wtφ(ϕ)f(λˆmt) .
Recall that equation (7) is given by:
p
′
at(Yat)ya,t + pat(Yat) =
wt
Aat
(22)
From equation (21), we can write equation (7) as:
−wtφ(ϕ)
f(λˆmt)
ya,t + pat =
wt
Aat
(23)
which is equation (16).
6.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We need to calculate the sign of the following derivative, ∂λmt
∂wmt
. Recall that equa-
tion (18) is equal to:
(φ(ϕ)λˆmt − 1
Aat
)2f(λˆmt) =
χφ(ϕ)
wmt
(24)
Define g(λˆmt) = (Aatφ(ϕ)λˆmt − 1)2f(λˆmt). Taking logarithm, we get:
ln(g(λˆmt)) = 2 ln(Aatφ(ϕ)λˆmt − 1) + ln(f(λˆmt)) (25)
Differentiating with respect to wmt yields:
g
′
(λˆmt)
g(λˆmt)
=
2Aatφ(ϕ)
Aatφ(ϕ)λˆmt − 1
+
f
′
(λˆmt)
f(λˆmt)
(26)
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Given that the probability density function of λˆmt is equal to f(λm) =
1
λm
√
2piσ
e−
(ln(λm)−µ)2
2σ2 ,
it can be shown that:
f
′
(λˆmt)
f(λˆmt)
= − 1
λˆmt
(1 +
ln(λˆmt)− µ
σ2
) (27)
As a result, equation (26) is equal to:
g
′
(λˆmt)
g(λˆmt)
=
2Aatφ(ϕ)
Aatφ(ϕ)λˆmt − 1
− 1
λˆmt
(1 +
ln(λˆmt)− µ
σ2
) (28)
Or after rearranging:
g
′
(λˆmt)
g(λˆmt)
=
1
λˆmt
+
2
λˆmt(Aatφ(ϕ)λˆmt − 1)
− 1
λˆmt
ln(λˆmt)− µ
σ2
(29)
Collecting terms and rearranging once more yields:
λˆmtg
′
(λˆmt)
g(λˆmt)
= 1 +
2
Aatφ(ϕ)λˆmt − 1
− ln(λˆmt)− µ
σ2
(30)
In other words, the sign of ∂λˆmt
∂wmt
depends on the sign of the following expression:
h(λˆmt) ≡ 1 + 2
Aatφ(ϕ)λˆmt − 1
− ln(λˆmt)− µ
σ2
(31)
The function h is continuously differentiable on the interval ( 1
Aatφ(ϕ)
,+∞) and is mono-
tone decreasing with h′(λˆmt) < 0. In addition, since lim
λˆmt→ 1Aatφ(ϕ)
+
h(λˆmt) = +∞ and
lim
λˆmt→+∞
h(λˆmt) = −∞, the intermediate value theorem of calculus guarantees that the equa-
tion h(λˆmt) = 0 has a unique solution that we call λˆm0.
Since h is decreasing, we have h(λˆmt) > 0 when
1
Aatφ(ϕ)
< λˆmt < λˆm0 and h(λˆmt) ≤ 0
when λˆmt ≥ λˆm0. As a result, we have g′(λˆmt) > 0 when 1Aatφ(ϕ) < λˆmt < λˆm0 and g′(λˆmt) < 0
when λˆmt > λˆm0. This implies that the function g is increasing for
1
Aatφ(ϕ)
< λˆmt < λˆm0,
decreasing for λˆmt > λˆm0, and reaches its maximum at λˆmt = λˆm0.
We define the threshold A¯m as:
A¯m =
χφ(ϕ)
(φ(ϕ)λˆm0 − 1Aat )2f(λˆm0)
(32)
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When 0 < Amt < A¯m, we have
φ(ϕ)χ
Amt
> (φ(ϕ)λˆm0 − 1Aat )2f(λˆm0). Hence there is no λˆmt
such that equation (18) is satisfied. On the other hand, since the function g has a ∩-shape,
equation (18) has at least one solution when Amt ≥ A¯m which satisfies λˆmt ≤ λˆm0.
We can now show the main result of the theorem that ∂λmt
∂wmt
≤ 0. Taking logarithm of
equation (18) yields:
2 ln(Aatφ(ϕ)λˆmt − 1) + ln(f(λˆmt)) = − ln(wmt) + ln(A2atχφ(ϕ)) (33)
Differentiating with respect to wmt yields:
∂λmt
∂wmt
g
′
(λˆmt)
g(λˆmt)
= − 1
wmt
(34)
Since we showed that g
′
(λˆmt) ≥ 0 when λˆmt ≤ λˆm0, it follows that equation (18) has at
least one solution which satisfies ∂λmt
∂wmt
≤ 0 when λˆmt ≤ λˆm0.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Following the notation introduced in Lemma 3, the price of home appliances is equal to
pat = wmtφ(ϕ)λˆmt. Taking logarithm and differentiating the price of home appliances with
respect to wmt gives:
1
pat
∂pat
∂wmt
=
1
wmt
+
1
λˆmt
∂λˆmt
∂wmt
(35)
According to equation (34), (30), and (31), we have:
∂λmt
∂wmt
= − 1
wmt
g(λˆmt)
g′(λˆmt)
= − 1
wmt
λˆmt
h(λˆmt)
(36)
As a result, the first derivative of the price of home appliances is equal to:
1
pat
∂pat
∂wmt
=
1
wmt
(1− 1
h(λˆmt)
) =
1
wmth(λˆmt)
(h(λˆmt)− 1) (37)
We know from the proof of Proposition 1 that h(λˆmt) > 0 when λˆmt < λˆm0. As a result,
the sign of the derivative ∂pat
∂wmt
depends on the sign of h(λˆmt)− 1.
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The threshold λˆm0 was defined as h(λˆm0) = 0. Since the function h is decreasing and
continuous, it must be the case that h(λˆmt) < 1 in a neighborhood of λˆm0 which implies
that ∂pat
∂wmt
< 0 in a neighborhood of λˆm0.
We also know from the proof of Proposition 1 that lim
λˆmt→ 1Aatφ(ϕ)
+
h(λˆmt) = +∞. In other
words, by continuity, there must exist a threshold λ¯ such that h(λˆmt) ≥ 1 when λˆmt ≤ λ¯
which implies that ∂pat
∂wmt
≥ 0 when λˆmt ≤ λ¯.
In summary we have shown the following result which is Proposition 2: There exists a
threshold λ¯ > 0 such that:
1. ∂pat
∂wmt
< 0 when λˆmt > λ¯,
2. ∂pat
∂wmt
≥ 0 when λˆmt ≤ λ¯.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Equation (18) can be written as:
(Aatφ(ϕ)λˆmt − 1)2f(λˆmt) = χφ(ϕ)A
2
at
wmt
(38)
Taking logarithm and differentiating the previous equation with respect to Aat yields:
∂λˆmt
∂Aat
g
′
(λˆmt)
g(λˆmt)
=
2
Aat
− 2
Aat − 1φ(ϕ)λˆmt
(39)
where the function g is defined in equation (25).
In Proposition 1, we showed that that g
′
(λˆmt) ≥ 0 when λˆmt ≤ λˆm0. Since the right-hand
side of equation (39) is negative, it follows that equation (18) has at least one solution which
satisfies ∂λˆmt
∂Aat
≤ 0 when λˆmt ≤ λˆm0.
To show the second part of Proposition 3, we take logarithm of equation (18) and differ-
entiate it with respect to ϕ. We get:
∂λˆmt
∂ϕ
g
′
(λˆmt)
g(λˆmt)
=
1
φ(ϕ)
− 2
φ(ϕ)− 1
Aatλˆmt
(40)
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In Proposition 1, we showed that that g
′
(λˆmt) ≥ 0 when λˆmt ≤ λˆm0. Since the right-hand
side of equation (40) is negative, it follows that equation (18) has at least one solution which
satisfies ∂λˆmt
∂ϕ
≤ 0 when λˆmt ≤ λˆm0.
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